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INTEGRITY OF AGENCY JUDICIAL PROCESS UNDER
THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT: THE SPECIAL
PROBLEM POSED BY INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE
ROUTE AWARDS
SCOTT C. WHITNEY*

The administrative process in this country developed in the latter
third of the nineteenth century to meet the inability of the tripartite
form of government established by the Constitution to deal adequately
with complex regulatory problems arising in industries whose economic
viability and conduct within society had become a matter of public
concern. It early became apparent that merely policing the conduct of
such industries was not sufficient, but rather that: "The primary emphasis of administrative activity had to center upon the guidance and
supervision of the industry as a whole." 1 Courts were clearly unequal
to the task of providing such continuing surveillance and the specialized
expertise which it entailed.
Paradoxically, the administrative agencies created by Congress to
preside over industries such as railroads, pipelines, communications,
power, securities, and airlines did not follow the constitutional pattern
of separation of powers between the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial-each maintaining its independence by the tension. resulting
from a balancing of powers. Rather these new agencies, which came
collectively to be referred to as the "Fourth Branch" of government,
2
each embraced rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement powers.
Although preceded by the prefix "quasi," these powers are unmistakably
legislative, judicial, and executive in nature. The vesting in a single administrative entity of such combined powers has been the source of many
of the institutional difficulties which have arisen in the administrative
process. The problems are particularly acute with respect to the "quasijudicial" powers of agencies.
It has long been recognized that an independent judiciary is a vital
prerequisite to effective democracy. Since as early as Hayburn's Case,"
*A.B., University of Nevada; JD., Harvard University. Professor of Law, The
College of William and Mary. Counsel to Bechhoefer, Snapp, Sharlitt & Trippe, Washington, D.C.
1. J. LANDis, THE ADMINISTRATVE PROCESS 15 (1938).
2. Id. at 2-4.
3. 2 US. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792). Beyond the "constitutional' courts which were of

concern in Hayburn's Case, Congress has created "legislative" courts whose raison d'etre
[17871
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the doctrine has developed that so-called "constitutional" courts-those
created pursuant to article III of the Constitution-may not take jurisdiction over any matter in which their decision would be subject to
revision by the executive branch. Although such rigid separation and
independence is not required of legislative courts and administrative tribunals, there remains implicit in our constitutional system of separate
powers the conviction that to the degree independence of the judicial
function diminishes, the probability of injustice increases.
In light of these considerations, it is not surprising that there have
been occasional proposals to separate the quasi-judicial function of the
agencies from their executive and rulemaking functions. 4 As early as
1938, it was suggested that:
The development of the administrative process has led to a substantial modification of the traditional doctrine of the separation
of powers. In special areas of regulation, executive, legislative and
judicial powers have been combined in a single instrumentality,
but such a commingling of functions is justified only where the
Congress finds that it is necessary to the effective performance of
the regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Government. Our
task force believes that wherever practicable there should be a
complete separation of the judicial functions of administrative
agencies from their own functions."
More recently, the Hector Memorandum advocated with respect to the
Civil Aeronautics Board that:
Adjudication of major litigated cases and appeals from administrative action should be performed by an administrative court,
free from policymaking or administrative detail .... In any field
arises from some constitutional power granted Congress apart from article III. Such
legislative courts are permitted to exercise functions which the Supreme Court has held
to undermine the independence of the judiciary and to be outside the competence of
constitutional courts. See Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 894 (1930).
4.

THE PRESIDENT'S ADVIsoRY COuNCIL ON ExEcUTIV

ToRY FRAMEwoRK:

REPORT ON SLEcmr

ORGANIZATION,

A

NEw REGULA-

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENcIEs

(January,

1971) (hereinafter cited as the Ash Report). Appendix 2-A, at 140, contains a summary
of some major studies relating to the creation of an administrative court, and Appendix
2-B, at 143, summarizes major bills to create an administrative court.
5. LEGAL SEVicES AND PROCEDURE, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTVE BRANCH OF TM GOVERNMENT (Hoover Commission) 84

(March, 1955). This study advocated creation of an administrative court that would
handle matters presently within the jurisdiction of the Tax Court, the Federal Trade!
Commission and the National Labor Relations !Board. Id. at 87-88.
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of Government regulation there are major, contested matters,
where there are parties in substantial and vigorous opposition, and
where substantial rights-public and private-are involved. Such
cases should be tried by an administrative court de novo, either
by the court itself or by hearing officers performing the functions
of special masters. Such cases should be decided on the basis of
p6licies formally established and announced in regulation, or
formal policy statements by the appropriate arm of the executive
branch. Such policies would be binding on the admimstrative court
unless they were held to go beyond the basic statutory authonza6
tion.
Three specific considerations have been advanced for separating the
judicial function of agencies. First, as noted by the Hector Memorandum, although administrative hearings and procedures are lengthy
and even over-judicialized, the "adjudicated cases do not give the parties
the full judicial hearing to which they are entitled." 7 In the context
of the Civil Aeronautics Board, this paradoxical situation arises because
such cases are notdecided "on the basis of general principles and standards known to the parties and applicable to all cases"' and because the
CAB frequently reverses the trial examiner and substitutes its judgment,
although it does not study the evidentiary record -and entrusts the
writing of its decision to anonymous opinion-writers who justify the
Board's extra-record conclusions as to what the desired result of the
case should be.'
A second basis advanced for separating the judicial function is the
incredible inefficiency of the administrative process.' 0 For example,
disposition of the Seven States Area Investigation" required well over
three years; moreover, it ultimately was decided on an extra-record
basis.12 The criticism of inefficiency has been expressed forcefully in
the-Ash Committee Report. 8
6. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory CommUssIonS, 69
YALE LJ.931, 962 (1960).

7.
8.
9.
who

Id. at 939.
Id.
Id. at 939-48. For a description of-the problems of opinion writers for the CAB
must reconcile contradictory policy decisions using identical or similar record

data see H. FmENDLY, TE F.DEaRa.

ADMiNis-rATvE AGENcMs 86-91 (1962).

10. Hector, supra note 6, at 932-38.
11. 28 C.A.B: 680 (1958).
12. Hector, supra note 6, at 934.
13. Ash Report, supra note 4, at 5. The report notes: "Overjudicialization encumbers
the time and energies of the commissioners and staff, causes undue case backlogs,.imposes
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Finally, the judicial process of agencies is susceptible to improper
outside influences. This may occur because of the failure of the process
to develop clear standards possessing precedential value to guide agency
action in successive cases and because of a procedural structure which
virtually necessitates Board review of the examiner's decision-a review
which rarely is based upon a detailed knowledge of the record. These
circumstances create "a void into which attempts to influence are bound
to rush; legal vacuums are quite like physical ones in that respect." 1
Consequently, as has been noted in regard to the FCC, decisions are
reached by employing "spurious criteria, used to justify results otherwise
arrived at."

'5

Several independent agencies have been subject to charges that decisions were reached on the basis of improper ex parte influences. 16 The
CAB itself has been involved in several such situations. The most celebrated of these was the Reopened New York-San Francisco Nonstop
Service Case,'7 which gave rise to substantive changes in the CAB's Rules
of Practice and Principles of Practice in order to protect the Board's
high costs upon litigants, prevents anticipatory action through rulemaking, deters mformat settlements, and precludes coordination of agency policy and priorities with those
of the executive branch." Id.
14. H. FIENDLY, supranote 9, at 22.
15. Id. at 54.
16. See, e.g., WVKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also H. FRiE-DLY,
supra note 9, which describes vis-a-vis the FCC, "the exposure of a number of boudoir
episodes, some having more piquancy and others less, but going, in the aggregate, beyond
anything experienced, or, perhaps more accurately, discovered, in other federal regulatory agencies." Id. at 54. In Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 358
U.S. 49 (1958), the Supreme Court vacated the affirmance by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit of an order allocating a television license. On remand,
the court of appeals vacated the FCC's order and remanded the proceeding to the
Commission. 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In WIRL Television Corp. v. Umted States,
358 U.S. 51 (1958), the Supreme Court vacated the affirmance of an FCC order and
remanded the case for the same reasons as the Sangamon case. One week later the
Court followed the same procedure for the same reason in WORZ, Inc. v FCC, 358
U.S. 55 (1958). See Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 261 F.2d 55 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
17. 35 C.A.B. 423 (1962). See Kansas-Oklahoma Local Service Case, 32 C.A.B. 577
(1960), Supplemental Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 32 C.A.B. 794 (1960) (involving allegations that a Board member had accepted unusual hospitality and was
thereby disqualified from participating in the decision); Reopened Kansas-Oklahoma
Local Service Case, 38 C.A.B. 63, 175-77 (1963) (applicants castigated but not disqualified for violating the Principles of Practice); cf. Colonial Air., Motions, 9 C.AB. 273,
274 (1948), where the Board considered whether it had the power to disqualify one of
its own members upon motion of a party to a proceeding before it and to relieve a
member from further participation at his own request. The Board concluded that it
had such-power.
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judicial character. This Article will examine the rules adopted by the
Board in 1961 and determine the extent to which such rules are circumvented by the practices followed in international airline route awards
which require Presidential review and approval. Where appropriate,
reforms will be suggested.
THE Reopened New York-San Francisco Non-stop Service
Case AND THE QUEST FOR JUDIcIAL INTEGRITY
In the New York-San Francisco Non-stop Service Case,18 the CAB
awarded American Airlines the right to provide third carrier non-stop
service between New York and San Francisco in competition with the
incumbents, TWA and United Airlines. The incumbents filed petitions
for reconsideration alleging, inter alia, that American and various civic
parties, principally San Francisco and the Port of New York Authority,
had engaged in ex parte activities violative of the CAB's Principles of
Practice and Rules of Practice. The CAB, after disposing of other issues
raised on reconsideration, scheduled oral argument on the ex parte
allegations.'- The petitions filed by the incumbents alleged four kinds of
improper ex parte activity but stopped short of alleging venality or
corruption on the part of the Board, the staff, the examiner, or any
party 20
18. 29 C.A.B. 811 (1959).
19. 30 C.AB. 1471-72 (1959).
20. The Board summarized the petitioners' allegations as follows:
The material affixed to the petitions is asserted to show (1) communications.
directly to the Board by the mayor and other representatives of the city of
San Francisco, (2) similar communications inspired by parties to the proceeding but written by non-pares, and (3) communications addressed? to
Members of Congress by San Francisco, Port of New York Authority
and, through third persons, by American, seeking intervention and the
exertion of influence in a manner other than that permitted by rule 14 of
the Board's Rules of Practice.
The letters are said to show further, by their own incompleteness, (4)
other contacts made m person or by telephone with Members of the. Board
or its staff, the extent and significance of which "can be no more than a
matter of conjecture." By affldavits and offers of proof, petitioners claim.
ability to ptove that certain ex parteletters to the Board from travel agents,,
sent directly or through a Member of Congress, were solicited by employees
of American.
Petitioners claim that -the alleged ex parte communications and. efforts to
solicit and inspire pressure resulted in violations of the Board's Principles
of Practice and Rules of Practice, the legal effect of which is to necessitate
vacation of order E-14412, 29 C.A.B. 811, and a hearing de-novo or, in the
alternative, a reopening of the proceeding with a preliminary hearing" to
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Rule 2 of the Board's Principles of Practice, as then written, set
forth activities constituting improper influence in cases which were to be
determined after notice and hearing and upon an evidentiary record.
In essence Rule 2 (a) made "improper" any "private" communication
on the "merits" of a case to the Board by any person unless in a manner
provided by law, that is, pursuant to the Board's Rules of Practice.
Rule 2 (c) prohibited, inter alia, any effort to sway the judgment of
the Board "by attempting to bring pressure or influence to bear upon
the Members of the Board or its staff." 21
The difficulty with these generalized rules was that they provided
no clear standards to distinguish attempts "to bring pressure or influence to bear" from legitimate statements by interested political, civic,
or other entities pursuant to section 401 (g) of the Federal Aviation Act,
which provides, inter alia, that: "Any interested person may file with
the Board a protest or memorandum in support of or in opposition to
the alteration, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of the
certificate." 22 Indeed, a federal court of appeals recently had upheld
the legality of solicitation of congressional participation in oral argument.2 3 The question raised by the incumbents was whether communications on the merits which legally could have been effected within the
format of the Board's Rules of Practice are flawed by virtue of having
been communicated by letters, telegrams, telephone calls, and personal
determine the facts as to ex parte activity and its effect upon the qualifications of the applicants and the Members of the Board.
30 C.A.B. 309, 310 n.2 (1959).
21. The Board quoted the applicable sections of Rule 2:
Par. 300.2 Hearing Cases-Improper Influence. It is essential in cases to
be determined after notice and hearing and upon a record that the Board's
judicial character be recognized and protected. In such cases(a) It is improper that there be any private communication on the
merits of the case to a member of the Board or its staff or to the examiner
in the case by any person, either in private or public life, unless provided for
'by law.
(c) It is improper that there be any effort by any person interested in
the case to sway the judgment of the Board by attempting to bring pressure or influence to bear upon the members of the Board or its staff, or
that such person or any member of the Board's staff, directly or indirectly,
give statements to the press or radio, by paid advertisements or otherwise, designed to influence the Board's judgment in the case.
30 C.A.B. at 311 n.2.
22. 49 U.S.C. § 13 71(g) (1970).
23. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752, 760 (2d Cir. 1959).
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communications. A related problem was whether those communications
which importuned the Board to institute an evidentiary hearing (and
to expedite it) constituted conduct prohibited by Rule 2 as then worded.
As to this latter question the Board, although it deemed Rule 2 to
preclude such communications on an ex parte basis, indicated that the
rule was sufficiently ambiguous that the appropriate standard of conduct was unclear. 24 Similarly, because virtually all of the written communications were placed in the correspondence file of the public docket,
the Board expressed doubts that they were "private" and stated its
intention to hold a rule making proceeding to clarify these questions.
The Board proceeded to exonerate the Port of New York Authority
but to conclude that San Francisco, "motivated by an excess of zeal and
a lack of understanding of our procedures, may have violated Rule 2." 28
The Board held, however, that since the offending material submitted
by the city could have been provided through proper channels and
since the incumbents had access to it, there had been no violation of
due process. 27 As to solicitation of congressional support and other
communications on the merits by influential political figures and as to
the attempt to discuss the merits of the case during an ex parte presentation to the Board arranged in the guise of discussing "general" aviation needs, the Board censured these tactics but held they did not taint
the proceeding nor justify denial of the new service to the public.2
Similarly, the Board exonerated American of inspiring San Francisco
and the Port of New York Authority to attempt improper influence
and of any impropriety in soliciting congressional support. The Board
did find that "procedural niceties" were violated by American's solicitation of direct communications by travel agents to the Board but dismissed them as activities "on the part of lower echelon representatives of the carrier who, out of misplaced loyalty, may be expected
to attempt to assist their employer's cause by spontaneous suggestions
which sometimes slight unknown niceties of practice before the
Board." 29 The Board concluded: "A careful review of the charges,
with all fairly pleaded allegations construed in favor of petitioners, has
failed to reveal any matter which would warrant vitiation of the pro24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30 C.A.B. at 309, 313.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 315-16
Id. at 317.
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ceeding, reassessment of American's comparative qualifications, or further investigation." "0
I The. incumbents sought review of the Board's decision in the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court adopted the
position advocated by the Department of Justice that "the Board was
under an independent affirmative duty to ascertain the extent of such
violations and to preserve the integrity of its own administrative process
by holding a hearing to determine all the relevant facts." 81 Accordingly,
the case was remanded to the Board for determination whether "the
Board's rules were so violated as to require a setting aside of the order." 32
The court retained jurisdiction pending hearing on this question and
a report by the Board to the court.
The Board, under the aegis of a new chairman, ordered full public
hearings. The trial examiner issued a detailed Initial Decision which was
reviewed carefully by the Board. It was then held that "the record does
not establish that either American or San Francisco violated the Rules
of Practice in Economic Proceedings." 11 The Board noted, however,
that "[t] he real substance of this case related to asserted violations by
both American and San Francisco of the Board's Principles of Practice" 34 as they read at the time of the initial proceedings.3 5
30. Id. at 319. The decision was by two members of the Board against one dissenting
member. The other two members took no part in the decision.
31. United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 281 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
32. Id.
33. Reopened New York-San Francisco Nonstop Service Case, 35 C.A.B. 423, 426
(1962).
34. Id.
35. In the interval the Board has changed Rule 2(a) (PR-43 effective December 6,
1960, as amended by PR-48 effective May 17, 1961). The Board noted that the revised
Rule 2 (a) provided:
It is essential in cases to be determined after notice and hearing and upon
a record, or any other cases which the Board by order may designate, that
the Board's -judicial character be recognized and protected. Therefore,
from the time of filing of an application or petition which can be granted
by the Board only after notice and hearing, or, in case of other matters,
from the time of notice by the Board that such matters shall be determined
after notice and hearing and upon a record or that its Principles of Practice shall be applicable thereto:
(a) A written or oral communication on any substantive or procedural
issue in the case to a Member of the Board or its staff, or to the examiner
in the case other than in compliance with the Board's Rule of Practice by
any person, either in private or public life, shall be deemed a private communication on the merits. Such communications, unless otherwise provided
for by law or published rule are hereby prohibited. Provided, That this
prohibition shall not be deemed to apply to informal complaints filed with

19M

INTERNATIONAL ROUTE AWARDS

A determination whether violations had occurred turned upon three
questions: (1) whether the phrase (in the then effective Rule 2) "cases
to be determined after notice and hearing and upon a record" prohibited certain conduct only after an application had been set for
hearing or whether it covered efforts to obtain a hearing; (2) what "private communication" meant in the normal agency context; and (3) how
to apply Rule 2(c) which prohibited attempts to bring pressure or
influence to bear on the Board or to sway its judgment by extra-record
activities. This latter question involved judgmental determination of
the parties' intent.
As to the first question, the Board held that the ambiguity in Rule
2 was such that it would be reasonable to regard a campaign to secure
expedited hearing as not proscribed.3 6 As to the second matter, it was
found that virtually all of the communications had been made public in
the correspondence file of the public docket.3 7 Finally, although activities such as the solicitation of press coverage and congressional intervention, ex parte civic communications on the merits, and travel agent
contacts "technically" violated Rule 2(c), the Board held that these
violations did not result in prejudice or deny a fair hearing to other
parties.38 It was concluded that "[t]he violations found are primarily
the Board or to communications with staff members of the Board who are
in the course of preparing a case, or for the purpose of determining
whether a complaint shall be docketed, or to the usual informal communications between counsel, including discussions to effectuate a stipulation,
or to settlement discussion between parties and the Board's enforcement
staff, or investigate activities, or to other communications which are deemed
proper in proceedings in the Federal courts. Communications which merely
make inquiry as to the status of a proceeding without discussing issues
are not considered communications on the merits. Any prohibited communication in writing received by the Board or its staff or the examiner
in the case, shall be made public by placing it in the correspondence file
of the case which is available for inspection and copying during business
hours in . . . the Board's Dockets Section, but will not be considered by
the Board or the examiner as part of the record for decision.
35 C.A.B. at 427.
The Board also had amended its Rules of Practice, effective May 17, 1961, to make
more specific the proper means of exercising the right of submitting a "protest' or
"memorandum" under section 401(c) and (g) of the Act. Rules 302.6, 8, and 14. On
December 5, 1961, the Board had issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to set forth
standards for determining priorities of hearing. This rule had not become final at the
date of decision in the Reopened case but subsequently became Rule 399.60, Standards
for determining priorities of hearing. 14 C.F.R. 561 (1972).
36. 35 C.A.B. 423, 435-36.
37. Id. at 436 n.73.
38. Id. at 435.
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technical in nature and their significance diminished by ambiguities in
the Board's Principles of Practice" " and that cancellation of the award
to American was not necessary as a deterrent to future violations inasmuch as the Board had changed its Rules and Principles of Practice to
preclude such conduct and to recognize and protect the judicial character of the Board. °
In modifying its Rules of Practice, the Board recognized that its judicial functions are similar to those of a court; moreover, it has taken
emphatic and detailed steps to insure that Board members and their
employees "conduct themselves with the same fidelity to standards of
propriety that characterize a court and its staff" and to insure that parties
conduct themselves in accordance with these strict judicial standards.4
TiH

CHINK IN THE BoARD's JUDICIAL ARMOR-SECTION 801
OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT

Although some basic problems in its process may not yet have been
obviated, 42 it seems clear that since the Reopened New York-San Francisco Case, the Board scrupulously has enforced the new and explicit

Principles of Practice, thereby assuring a judicial ambience in its domestic
route proceedings. The integrity of the Board's process is diminished,
however, in route proceedings involving authority for a United States
air carrier to engage in either overseas, international, or territorial operations or authority for a foreign air carrier to serve the United States

or a territory thereof, since section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act
requires, inter alia, that the Board submit its decision to the President
for approval prior to publication. 5
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id. at 437. The Board reported its findings to the court, which thereupon
affirmed the Board's award to American. United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 309 F.2d 238
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
Subsequently, the Board further strengthened its Rules to preclude improper conduct
prejudicial to its judicial character by prohibiting gifts and unusual hospitality to the
Board or its staff. (PR-75, 28 F.R. 2708, Mar. 20, 1963). Moreover, the Board has
permanently disqualified any former Board member or employee from acting in matters
in which they personally participated during their government employment. (PR-115,
35 F.R. 18193, Nov. 28, 1970).
41. Rule 300.1, 14 C.F.R. 412 (1972).
42. Some of these problems have been noted by Judge Friendly and Mr. Hector and
include the lack of intelligible precedential standards for decision and the delay and
evidentiary problems heretofore noted that inhere in the essentially duplicative process
of trying a case before the examiner and in effect re-litigating it before the Board.
43. Section 801 provides:
The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or revo-
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The President's power of approval can be exercised in a fashion
that circumvents the judicial safeguards that the Board has devised in
its adjudicatory processes. The Board in an international route proceeding follows strictly its Rules and Principles of Practice. After formally instituting the proceeding, it follows the same procedural format
employed in a domestic case, 44 successively passing through prehearing
conference, exchange of exhibits, rebuttal exhibits, and written testimony pursuant to a schedule established by the examiner. The examiner
presides over an evidentiary hearing and upon the close of the record
sets a date for briefs and proposed findings. After he issues his Recommended Decision,45 exceptions are filed thereto and briefs submitted to
the Board, which, after hearing oral argument, reaches its decision. At
this point the procedure in international cases becomes subject to section
801, and all pretense to judicial treatment of the decision ends. The
Board's Rules and Principles of Practice no longer have application.
Parties to the proceeding are free to make ex parte presentations to the
executive'branch, subject only to statutory prohibitions against bribery,
graft, and conflicts of interest and the standards of ethical conduct for
government officers and employees.46
The various Transpacific Route Cases illustrate the consequences of
executive revision of Board decisions. Prior to World War II, Pan
American Airways was the "chosen instrument" that provided U.S.
flag service across the Pacific. In 1946, Northwest Airlines was granted
a route across the northern Pacific. 47 Thereafter, the Board denied Pan
American's application for a competitive route across the northern
cation of, and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in, any certificate authorizing an air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation, or air transportation between places in the same Territory or
possession, or any permit issuable to any foreign air carrier under section
1372 of this tide, shall be subject to the approval of the President. Copies
of all applications in respect of such certificates and permits shall be transmitted to the President by the Board before hearing thereon, and all decisions thereon by the Board shall be submitted to the President before publication thereof.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1461 (a) (1972), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (a) (1970).
44. See Part 302, Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings, 14 C.F.R. 415 et seq.
(1972).
45. Rule 302.27(b) (2) (i) provides that in cases subject to section 801 of the Act,
examiners shall render a recommended decision rather than the initial decision provided
for in Rule 302.27 (a).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,222, 30 Fed. Reg. 6469 (May 11, 1965)
as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,590, 3 C.F.R. 405 (1972).
47. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:7,87

Pacific, but President Eisenhower disagreed with the Board's decision
and requested that the case be reopened.4" The Board reopened the
case, but persevered in its denial of the application. Once again, the
President requested the Board to reconsider, and again the Board retained its original decision, with which the President at length acquiesced.49 The President, however, requested a further comprehensive
transpacific proceeding which was.duly held. The Board at that point
granted, together with a domestic mainland-Hawaii route to Western
Airlines, Pan American's application for a northern Pacific route but
ordered a corresponding award to Northwest ove the central Pacific in
competition with Pan American.5" The President, however, decided
that no awards should be granted and, although he lacked power..Qver
domestic awards, the Board acquiesced in the President's stated desire
that no domestic award be granted.51 Western appealed this decision to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Although the
court held that the Board had found the domestic award toWe stern
was required by public convenience and necessity, it declined io order
the Board to finalize the avard but, remanded the case to the. Board fot
further proceedings. 512 Again the case was processed in strict accordance
with .te Bo 'd's Rules and Principles of Practice, extensive hearings
were held, an examiner's Recommended Decision issued, exceptions
fild, and briefs and oral argument presented to the Board. The Board,
after due deliberation, produced a decision which was submitted to the
President for approval.5 3 The case had been divided into domestic
(mainland-Hawaii) and international phases (mainland/Hawaii-foreign)
in order to forestall the problems encountered in the 1961 decision that
led to Western's appeal. Decision in the domestic phase was to be held
in abeyance until decision was reached on the international phase, inasmuch as the route patterns in the two phases were deemed to be inextricably interrelated. President Johnson accepted all but one of the
Board's awards, a central Pacific route awarded American Airlines to
Tokyo via Hawaii, which he voided on the ground that additional
service to Japan was not in the national interest. The Board modified
48. Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47, 48 (1955).

49. Reopened Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case, 26 C.AB. 481, 486, 510 (1958).
50. Transpacific Route Case, 32 C.A.B. 928, 965, 977 (1961).
51. Id. at 976-77.
52. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 351 F.2d 778, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
53. Transpacific Route Investigation (International Phase), 2 Av. L. REIP.
(CAB November 18, 1968).

21;8S2
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its decision accordingly the following day 54 and announced it would
allow filing of petitions for reconsideration within 30 days. This period
extended beyond the commencement of the term of office of President
Nixon who, on January 24, 1969, recalled the decision; the Board then
vacated its decision.55 Thereafter, the President announced a new and
substantially different transpacific route pattern based upon undisclosed
new traffic forecasts.5 6 The Board adopted all but one of the President's
route patterns, namely, that to the south Pacific.
The Board then instituted a South Pacific Deferred Phase proceeding
in which it reaffirmed its original award to Continental with modifications intended to bring the award into conformity with the President's
criteria. 57 The President, however, rejected this decision, and the Board
ultimately selected another carrier (American) to provide the south
Pacific service along the lines of the Presidential criteria. 55
Throughout the course of the various Transpacific decisions, each
Presidential action precipitated outcries of "cronyism," undue influence,
and unchecked extra-judicial maneuvering. 59 Although the criticism
in the popular press and trade journals can be fairly characterized as
speculative, certain more substantive conclusions can be adduced from
the p'ublic record. It is clear that the President can overrule Board
decisions on grounds other than national security and foreign relations
considerations. As has been noted, President Nixon radically altered
the Board's Transpacific decision of December 19, 1968, on the basis
of a new traffic survey or forecast which was extra-record and-never
disclosed to the parties. When such extra-xecord economic data become
dispositive, the elaborately protected judicial process of the Board is
rendered largely nugatory.
The existence or extent of ex parte activities by the interested airline
parties in the White House and various executive departments throughout the Transpacific litigation is at most a matter of speculation and
54. Id. Supplemental Opinion, 21,833 (CAB December 19, 1968).
55. Id. 21,857 (CAB April 14, 1969).
56. Id.
57. Transpacific Route Investigation (South Pacific Deferred Phase), 2 Av. L.
REP. 21,868 (CAB July 21, 1969).
58. Id. 21,868.01.
59. For a detailed survey of the various press and trade journal commentary and
speculation about the true motivation for the various presidential decisions see Note,
Sectioz 801 of'the Federal Aviation Act-The President and the Award of International
Air Routes to Domestic Carriers: A Proposal for Change, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 517, 529-33
(f970) [hereinafter referred to as NYU Proposal].
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surmise. However, in a subsequent Board proceeding, the AmericanWestern Merger Case, secret ex parte efforts were detected and made
a part of the evidentiary record. 0 This proceeding involved the issue
of the legality and desirability of American Airlines acquiring the routes
of Western Airlines, whose system includes international routes to
Canada and Mexico; consequently, the award required section 801
approval by the President. The so-called merger was opposed by
numerous carriers whose primary concern was their inability to compete effectively with the larger and more powerful merged carrier that
would result if the proposal were approved. In anticipation of the
ultimate referral of the decision to the President, the chief executive
officers of American and Western made various ex parte presentations
on the merits of the merger to Assistant Secretary of Transportation
Charles Baker, Assistant Attorney General McClaren (as to anti-trust
implications), Secretary of the Treasury John Connally and Mr. Peter
Flanigan of the White House staff. These presentations were established on the record and are summarized with record citations:
(1) Mr. Spater (President of American) denied a meeting between
himself, Mr. Taylor (President of Western) and Assistant Secretary Baker during the trip to Washington in connection with the
November 5, 1970 ex parte presentation to the Board (tr. 270).
(2) Mr. Spater at first denied any meetings with government officials other than the Board, Assistant Secretary Baker and Mr.
McLaren (tr. 329). Later he had to admit meetings with Secretary of Treasury Connally and Mr. Flanigan of the White House
Staff (tr. 429-31, 473).
(3) Mr. Spater at first claimed he did not know of any submission
of memorandum to the Department of Justice (tr. 326) when in
fact an extensive memo in support of the merger had been submitted, which Mr. Spater admitted the following day (tr. 345).
(4) When Mr. Spater finally admitted to the submissions to the
Departments of Justice and Transportation, he denied knowledge
of the submission of memos to any other agency (tr. 350-1), when
in fact, as he later admitted, two memoranda had been transmitted
to Secretary Connally, with a blind copy of the transmittal to Mr.
Spater and only Mr. Spater (CO-R547).
(5) Mr. Spater denied categorically (at the hearing) American's
willingness to accept any restriction on the merger (tr. 241), yet
later had to admit that American had by ex parte submission indi60. American-Western Merger Case, 2 Av. L. REP.

22,082 (CAB June 13, 1972).
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cated a willingness to accept several restrictions (tr. 429, 515, 51721; CO-R540), which were nowhere mentioned in American's
exhibits.0 1
All of these ex parte presentations were made just prior to and during
the CAB hearing. The extent of subsequent presentations, if any,
is not known.62 The foregoing description, however, is sufficient to
indicate that in international cases, the CAB judicial precautions are
nullified by the present statutory scheme which encourages and permits
the conduct of a parallel extra-record prosecution of the case directed
at the President and his advisers.
Moreover, the problem in international route awards is aggravated
by the fact that, with only narrow exceptions, judicial review of such
decisions is not available. The Supreme court in Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., held that decisions exclusively within the prerogative of the executive department are "beyond
the competence of the courts to adjudicate." 63 Therefore, a CAB
order involving international air transportation and subject to Presidential approval under section 801 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958) is not subject to judicial
review. As a result, an aggrieved party is faced with the dilemma that
prior to Presidential action, the Board's order is not final and hence
not ripe for review, while after Presidential action, the decision is
insulated from judicial review because of the exercise of exclusive
executive power. 64 The minority of the Court in Waterman noted that
"no matter how extreme the action of the Board, the courts are powerless to correct it under today's decision." 65 Although this view appears
to have been somewhat pessimistic in light of subsequent decisions granting review in certain situations,0 0 the proposition remains unaltered
61. Brief for Continental Air Lines, Inc. at 46, American-Western Merger Case, 2
Av. L. RzP. 22,082 (CAB June 13, 1972).
62. For a detailed account of airline ex parte "lobbying" of executive branch officials see Burby, Air Interests Follow Stylized Ritual in Lobbying on American-Western
Merger, 4 NAT'L J. 546 (April 1, 1972) and Burby, Lawyers and Air Crews Try to
Break Rhythm of American-Western Merger Dance, 4 NAT'L J. 607 (April 8, 1972).
63. 333 U.S. 103, 114 (1948).
64. Id. at 114.
65. Id. at 118.
66. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 321 F.2d
394 (D.C. Cir. 1963), which contains the following dictum: "Whether the President
has statutory or constitutional authority to terminate Pan American's route authorization for reasons of public convenience and necessity is quite a different question from
the one which faced the Court in Waterman. That case neither settles nor illuminates
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that Board decisions subject to approval of the President, who can
modify them on the basis of extra-record data, are not subject to judicial review provided the President or the Board have not exceeded their
statutory or constitutional authority.
Thus, when Continental Airlines sought to challenge, inter alia, Presidential reliance upon an undisclosed extra-record traffic survey or
forecast as the basis for changing the Board's Transpacific decision of
December 19, 1968,67 the court dismissed Continental's petition on the
ground that it challenged an order not yet final and hence not ripe for
review. 68 Moreover, it is unlikely that Continental's theory would have
prevailed in any event, inasmuch as courts have held that lapses in procedural due process, unlike acts exceeding statutory authority, do not
constitute grounds for reviewing a section 801 decision. 9 For whatever
more than faintly the issues which would face a court reviewing the authority of the
Board or the President in this case to terminate Pan American's route authorization."
Id. at 396. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
the court noted: "Though Waterman has not been overruled by the Supreme Court,
its apparently sweeping contours have been eroded by recent Circuit Court opinions."
Id.at 492. As examples, the court cited "particularly" American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1963) and Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 380
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967). 392 F.2d at 492 n.11. The court then cited the following cases
as "precursors" of the American and Pan American decisions: Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 941 (1951), ("where the
court in following Waterman, was careful to point out that 'the President and the
Board acted within their legal powers in making the order,' 184 F.2d at 71, leaving
open the question of what the court would have done had the Board acted beyond its
lawful authority"); Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965); and British Overseas Airways Corp. v. CAB,
304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 392 F.2d at 492 n.11. For a general discussion of this
"erosion" see Miller, The Waterman Doctrine Revisited, 54 GEo. L.J. 5 (1965).
67. Petition of Continental Air Lines, Inc. for Judicial Review, Continental Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, No. 22,934 (D.C. Cir., July 1, 1969). See notes 56-58 supra & accompanying text.
68. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, No. 22,934 (D.C. Cir., July 1, 1969).
69. In United States Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 222 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1955), the
court stated: "It has thus been settled, in so far as this court is concerned, that, despite
claims of procedural irregularity, under the Waterman opinion and decision the court
has no jurisdiction to review orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board in matters which
by statute are for the determination of the President." Id. at 304. Subsequently, in
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965), Judge Burger, although
noting that the court has power to review the issue of whether the Board exceeded its
statutory power in reaching a decision submitted to the President for approval, clearly
indicated that "allegations of denial of procedural due process as a predicate for review
of action vested by Congress in the President . . . [are] like [those) that the action is
unsupported by substantial evidence. . . . They thus encounter the difficulty, recognized in Waterman, that the President must be free to consider broad 'evidentiary'
policy factors not involved, and indeed not relevant, in Board proceedings and that the
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reason, Continental did not press its appeal after final decision in the
Transpacific Investigation.
Survey of the history of de facto Presidential power under the aegis
of section 801 indicates that such power as exercised far exceeds the
original intent of Congress. In the first place, the President did not
seek this power, but rather it was the brainchild of the Departments of
Navy, State, and War, who jointly advocated such review as essential
to national defense and foreign relations considerations.7 ° The following summary of these national defense considerations is less than impressive.
If it were not for [Presidential review], the Army and Navy
would have no opportunity to come into the picture at all nor
would the State Department. Now, where the President has control, he can refer the matter to the State, War and Navy Departments before he reaches a decision. You can see the necessity of
the President, from an international defense standpoint, having an
opportunity to review the question as to whether ...

a certificate

of convenience and necessity shall be issued to an American-flag
line flying through our Territory for the reason that they carry
foreign passengers. We do not want foreign passengers flying over
our fortifications in our Territory so that they can observe them.
In flying to foreign countries, from a national defense and international relations standpoint, it is very important that the President, the War Department, and the Navy Department as well as
the State Department, have something to say about where our air
bases will be established in foreign countries.7 1
Even in terms of 1938 conditions, the first reason noted above lacks
persuasiveness. The ability of foreign espionage agents to fly over
defense installations in the United States is scarcely germane to possession of section 801 power by the President to approve CAB route orders
to United States carriers. As to the est'ablishment of air bases in foreign
countries, whatever the circumstances may have been in 1938, virtually
all commercial airports served by United States flag carriers in foreign
President must be free to exercise unreviewable discretion as to the weight to-be given

to such extrajudicial factors." Id. at 352. No court has focused on a situation in which
the extra-judicial factors are in fact traffic data and material, that are the kind of
evidence involved in and relevant to determination of Board proceedings.-

70. Hearings on H.R. 9738, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 37-48, 147-48 (1938).
71. Id. at 38.
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countries have long since been established. Moreover, it is difficult to
appreciate any matter related to national security that is served by
retaining present section 801 powers insofar as they relate to the selection of carriers. How the selection of American Airlines, for example,
over Continental to serve the south Pacific route attains national defense
significance has never been explained. Both operate virtually identical
jet equipment, both proposed comparable service, and both were solvent
carriers found by the Board to be "fit, willing and able" to provide the
service. As will be discussed in more detail, valid consideration can be
taken of any national defense and foreign relations interests which
may be affected by a CAB decision without the plenary grant of power
embodied in section 801.
It is thus clear that partly as a result of Waterman and other judicial
legislation and partly as a result of Presidential initiative, de facto
Presidential power now far exceeds the review of Board decisions which
may be necessary to protect national defense and foreign relations considerations. The Senate Commerce Committee in 1957 recognized the
expansive effect of Waterman, stating:
Although originally intended merely as a means for Executive
review, granting powers to be used only in exceptional cases, section 801 has had the unforeseen but perhaps inevitable effect of
transferring from the Board to the White House ultimate responsibility in every respect for the disposition of cases within its
purview.
The broad extent to which the President's authority under this
section has come to be construed is significantly set forth by the
Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Chicago and Southern
Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp. (333 U.S. 103). The Court
therein held that a Board order covered by section 801 is not a final
disposition of the matter, but a mere 'recommendation' to the President. Noting, in fact, that the Board altogether ceases to function
as an arm of the Congress in such cases, and becomes virtually
an organ of the executive branch, the Court states: "Nor is the
President's control of the ultimate decision a mere right of veto.
It is not alone issuance of such authorizations that are subject to
his approval, but denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation or
suspension, as well. And likewise subject to his approval are the
terms, conditions, and limitations of the order (49 U.S.C. 601).
Thus, Presidential control is not limited to a negative but is a positive and detailed control, unparalleled in the history of American
administrative bodies."
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The practical result of this total shifting of authority has been
to subject the President directly to all the burdens and pressures
of air commerce regulation. Thus, he is called upon in every secdon 801 case to pass final judgment on the fitness, willingness, and
ability of air carriers to perform the service in question-these being the fundamental statutory criteria for the issuance of any certificate. In the great majority of instances, including those covered
by section 801, the decision called for must be based entirely on
economic or technical considerations having no practical bearing
whatsoever on national defense policy or the conduct of foreign
2
relationsJ.
As an example, the Committee hypothesized a case involving a determination as to which of two equally qualified carriers should be
certified to fly a given international route. It was noted that after a
full hearing and a finding by the Board, the disappointed applicant
could renew his efforts at the White House even without framing his
appeal in terms of a national security or foreign policy issue. Of most
concern to the Committee, however, was the unavailability of judicial
review in such cases. Adverting to the harm to administrative and
judicial procedures resulting under such circumstances, the Committee
noted: "Matters of an economic or regulatory nature which the Board,
acting under the aegis of the Congress, is alone competent to decide
and for which it alone is adequately staffed and ordered have somehow
unwittingly become delegated to the Executive." 73
Senate bill 1423 in the 85th Congress, which resulted from these
hearings, would have amended section 801, inter alia, "by restricting
the President's power to overrule CAB certification actions to foreign
air transportation cases involving national defense or foreign policy"
and by requiring the President "to submit to Congress a report of any
instance in which he overrules a Board order as contrary to the interests
of defense or foreign policy." 74
Subsequent developments have reinforced the Senate committee's
conclusion as to the "harm to sound administrative and judicial procedures" that arises from unreviewable Presidential power to determine
international route awards. First, it has been confirmed that the Presi72. SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTE, IMPROVEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR THE DEvEopmENT OF FOREIGN AIR COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 119, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1957).
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 1, 3. S.1423 passed the Senate (104 CoNG. REc. 5137 (1957)) but was not
acted upon by the House.
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dent in reaching his decisions goes beyond foreign policy and national
defense considerations and employs extra-record analyses relating to
traffic and economic data despite the availability of comparable record
data compiled under judicial safeguards by the CAB during the hearing
process. Moreover, the American-Western Merger proceeding established that parties make extensive extra-record substantive submissions
to Presidential advisers which presumably are the source of some of the
analyses relied upon by the President in reaching his final, unreviewable
decision.
Accordingly it now appears desirable, if not necessary, to reassess
the proper extent of Presidential power over international route awards.
Two questions require consideration. First, is there any need for Presidential review and approval of CAB action at the licensing stage in order
to protect national security and foreign relations considerations? Alternatively, can these executive branch responsibilities be handled adequately in another fashion? Second, is there any legal basis or reason
for Presidential consideration of economic matters delegated by Congress to the CAB, such as fitness, traffic forecasts, and economic operating
results?
Congress clearly intended that section 801 interject the President
into the licensing process that is otherwise delegated to the CAB and
which must be conducted in accordance with judicial standards. This
anomalous dual delegation, however, was made subject to judicial review
by section 1006(a) of the Act except as to "any order in respect of
any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President.""
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1941 ignored
the plain wording of section 1006(a) and in effect judicially amended
the statute by holding that review of orders authorizing issuance to
American carriers of international routes is "so dependent upon considerations resting in Executive discretion that it cannot be regarded as
authorized by Section 1006 (a) ." 7 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
75. "Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Authority under this Act,
except any order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the
President as provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to 'review by the
courts of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upon petition, filed within sixty days after the entry of such order,
by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order." Federal Aviation Act of
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1006(a), 72 Stat. 731 (emphasis supplied). Substantially the

same language obtains in 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970).
76. Pan American World Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810, 814 (2d Cir. 1941).
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Steamship Corp.71 emphasized the express language of section 1006(a)
in holding such decisions reviewable. The Supreme Court reversed this
decision and upheld the view of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit that despite the clear language of section 1006 (a), "an exemption
is to be implied." Thus, Presidential decisions involving American carriers of international routes are excepted from judicial review.7 Thus,
with their section 801 decisions insulated from judicial review except in
cases where the CAB clearly exceeded its statutory power, successive
Presidents have expanded the scope of their participation.
The judicial interpretation of sections 801 and 1006(a) appears to
have been influenced by the constitutional powers of the President with
respect to national security and foreign relations. For example, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it "incredible that in
enacting Section 1006(a) Congress intended to permit review of . . .
cases... where the constitutional authority of the President to negotiate with foreign nations" is involved.79 The Supreme Court in Waterman also referred to the ability of Congress to delegate "very large grants
of its power over foreign commerce" to the President and to the President's powers as "commanderlin-chief and as the Nation's organ in
foreign affairs," 80 and concluded that the President's order "draws
vitality from either or both sources." 81
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Various commentators have recognized the need to change the present
international air route licensing procedure and have suggested various
alternatives. The Markham analysis points out that "the present procedure for deciding cases subject to Section 801 needs re-examination and revision . . . the decisional process under Section 801 is an
anomaly. A full-scale quasi-judicial proceeding must be conducted
before the Board, but it does not serve the traditional purposes of such
a procedure: To protect the basic 'rights' of the parties and to produce
a decision, on the merits, in accordance with lawful standards and procedures. On the other hand, the actual decision-making authority is
vested in a different branch of the Government-the President-who
may act as a matter of executive discretion on different information and
77. 159 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1947).
78. 333 U.S. 102, 106-09 (1948).

79. 121 F.2d at 814.
80. 333 U.S. at 109.
81. Id. at 110.
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different grounds, and largely or entirely free of judicial scrutiny.
Surely, a sounder procedure for reaching decisions in this important
class of cases can be devised." 82
One approach considered by Markham is to adopt the procedure
suggested by the minority of the Court in Waterman, whereby concurrence by the Board and the President would be required to decide
a case, but the most the President could do would be to veto a Board
decision and not modify or supplant it. The Board decision would be
subject to judicial review, but the reasons for Presidential veto would
not. According to Markham such a procedure would protect the
integrity of the Board's judicial process and would preserve "the freedom of exercise and the integrity of presidential power in the area of
military and foreign affairs ... ,, 8
There are two evident difficulties with this procedure-one of which
Markham recognized. First, problems could arise if the President exercised his veto but the Board adhered to its decision. Markham notes
that "[i]t is certainly impractical, and perhaps constitutionally impossible, to provide a procedure for overriding the President's 'veto' in
such a situation; and to give the President the power to override a
contrary Board 'decision' would simply reinstate the existing procedure." ' The only amelioration Markham suggests is that if, as he
appears to contemplate, the Board yields, at least the decision would be
subject to judicial review. 5 This view, however, assumes a willingness
on the part of the courts to conduct the very kind of review they have
refused repeatedly to undertake. If the only safeguard against Presidential pressure on the Board is judicial review, it is evident that, absent
a reversal of a long line of judicial decisions, such review of Presidential discretion would not be likely.
A second difficulty with the Markham proposal is that the mere
act of veto can undermine the integrity of Board decision. For example,
route proceedings frequently involve an incumbent carrier opposing
authorization of competition. Such a carrier would be inclined to
mount an extra-judicial campaign in the executive branch to persuade
the President to veto additional competitive awards, and the Board and
the applicants for competitive rights would be powerless to override
such a veto.
82. Markham, Two Proposals for Amendment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
35 J. AiR L. & CoM. 591, 597 (1969).
83. Id. at 598.
84. Id. at 599.
85. Id.

1973]
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An alternative approach suggested by Markham would be to repeal
section 801 and remove Presidential participation from the licensing
function altogether. The President would still be able to make an
input in the post-licensing phase by virtue of section 802, which empowers the Secretary of State to "advise ... and consult with the...
Board . . . concerning the negotiation of any agreement with foreign
governments for the establishment or development of air navigation,
including air routes and services." 8 6 Moreover, section 1102 provides:
In exercising and performing their powers and duties under
this Act, the Board and the Secretary of Transportation shall do
so consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States
in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the United States and any foreign country or foreign countries and the Board shall not, in exercising and performing its
powers and duties with respect to certificates of convenience and
oblinecessity, restrict compliance by any air carrier with any
87
country.
foreign
any
by
imposed
liability
or
gation, duty
Markham recognizes that this system would not remove the possibility
of disagreement, perhaps even deadlock, but appears to believe that
since "the disagreement would not take the blunt form of a presidential veto," it would be more negotiable.8
Two flaws are evident in this approach. First, the Board, having
embodied its decision in a final legal order, would have no flexibility
to negotiate away any significant substantive part of its decision without engaging in the cumbersome and dubious expedient of setting aside
the order and reopening the proceeding to fashion a new decision on
the merits. Furthermore, there is little dispute that the President should
have some voice in the ultimate result at least as to national security and
foreign relations considerations. To postpone this input until after the
licensing is concluded would create the risk either of having to revamp
the Board's decision or of rendering the Presidential input a polite
fiction.
The proposed amendment of section 801 which passed the Senate in
1957 and would have provided a kind of Congressional review of Presidential action in case of veto has already been mentioned."9 Such a
86. Id. at 600.
87. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970).

88. Markham, supra note 82, at 601.
89. See note 74 supra & accompanying text.
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system would not preclude deadlock and has the additional potential
disadvantage of exacerbating executive-legislative relations, thereby raising constitutional controversies. Moreover, it is probable that Congress
would be beset with ex parte presentations no less destructive to the
judicial integrity of international air route proceedings than those now
directed to the executive branch.
Furthermore, if Congress were to agree with the President but the
Board remained firm, it is by no means clear that Congress would possess
power to override the Board without enacting further legislation. Thus,
deadlock would amount to veto. On the other hand, if Congress were to
agree with the Board, it would be equally powerless to override the
President's veto without taking legislative action. Ad hoc legislative
action on a case-by-case basis would be prohibitively cumbersome and
time consuming.
A final approach which has been suggested is the NYU proposal,
which would amend section 801 to confine the President to matters
of route selection but would exclude the President from carrier selection-the aspect of the decision which presumably generates most ex
parte presentations 0 Under this approach the President would also
have the powers heretofore noted under sections 802 and 1102 of the
Act.
It is submitted that this proposal, like the others suggested, does not
solve the problem. First, by the very act of structuring the route
awards, the President could continue to control to a great extent carrier
selection. President Nixon's letter to the Board disapproving the award
to Continental of a south Pacific route did not mention carriers by
name. Instead, the President's letter called for a route that would
provide single-plane service between various east coast and midwest
coterminals, on the one hand, and points in the south Pacific on the
other. When the Board re-structured its award to Continental to meet
these route criteria (by permitting Continental to serve the eastern and
midwest coterminals on flights serving the south Pacific route), the
President nonetheless disapproved the award to Continental, thereby
forcing the Board either to award the route to one of the two remaining
applicants who could meet these criteria or abort the case.
Thus, under the NYU proposal skillful airline advocates would still
have strong incentive to make ex parte presentations to the executive
branch in an effort to obtain route selection criteria which only their
clients could meet. The NYU proposal concedes that the proposed
90. See NYU Proposal, supra note 59, at 536.

"
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amendment would not "completely prevent competing airlines from
appealing to the White House in an attempt to influence the President's
route structure decision; nor does it preclude the possibility that route
selection in a given instance might predetermine the Board's choice of
carrier(s) ."91
CONCLUSION

The only apparent way to insure the integrity of the Board's judicial
process in international air route cases while assuring the President an
opportunity to apply national security and foreign relations considerations is to devise a system which includes the following:
1) repeal of section 801 in its entirety;
2) substitution, therefor, of a system whereby appropriate spokesmen from the executive branch participate as parties in the licensing
proceeding and present foreign relations and national security factors
in an evidentiary format subject to cross-examination and rebuttal; 92
3) continuation of post-licensing controls over bilateral agreements as
they have operated in the past, that is, the Board would remain subject to
sections 802 and 1102 of the Act.
Under this approach, since ex parte presentations to the President
would no longer have any effect, these incursions on the judicial integrity
of international route proceedings would be precluded. Furthermore,
the legitimate concerns of the executive branch would be fully and
responsibly presented on the record, and the Board would have before
it all of the relevant decisional ingredients on which to base its final
order, including national security and foreign relations considerations.
A similar procedure was in fact adopted in the consolidated Pacific
Islands Local Service Investigation-TransPacificRoute Investigation
(PacificIslands DeferredPhase),93 in which the President, by letter dated
July 16, 1970, requested the Board to reopen the record to receive
additional information concerning issues in the case not theretofore presented to the Board.
In the eyent that some foreign relations or national security factors
required secret handling, the Board's Rules of Practice provide for exec91. Id. at 537-8.
92. CAB Rule 15. provides for such intervention. CAB Rules of Practice § 302.15
(PR-70 ,as amended by PR-100 effective December 1, 1966). The Department of Justice,
Department of Transportation, Department of State, and other executive departments
have participated as .party. intervenors in various CAB proqeedings pursuant to this Rule.
93. CAB Order 71-7-174 (July-27, 1971).
"
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utive sessions and confidential treatment upon an appropriate showing
by any party and specifically a government party. 4 In fact, most of
94. Rule 302.39 provides:
Objections to public disclosure of information.
(a) Information contained in paper to be filed. Any person who objects
to the public disclosure of any information contained in any paper filed in
any proceeding, or in any application, report, or other document filed pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended,
or any rule, regulation, or order of the Board thereunder, shall segregate,
or request the segregation of, such information into a separate paper and
shall file it, or request that it be filed, with the examiner or the person
conducting the hearing or proceeding, as the case may be, or with the
person with whom said application, report, or document is required to be
filed, separately in a sealed envelope, bearing the caption of the enclosed
paper and the notation 'Classified or Confidential Treatment Requested
Under § 302.39.' At the time of filing such paper, or when the objection
is made by a person not himself filing the paper, application, report or other
document, within five (5) days after the filing of such paper, the objecting party shall file a motion to withhold the information from public disclosure, in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (d) of
this section, or in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph
(c) of this section if objection is made by a Government department or a
representative thereof. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, copies of the filed paper and of the motion need not be served upon
any other party unless so ordered by the Board.
(b) Information contained in oral testimony. Any person who objects
to the public disclosure of any information sought to be elicited from a
witness or deponent on oral examination shall, before such information is
disclosed, make his objection known. Upon such objection duly made,
the witness or deponent shall be compelled to disclose such information
only in the presence of the examiner or the person before whom the deposition is being taken, as the case may be, the official stenographer and such
attorneys for and lay representative of each party as the examiner or the
person before whom the deposition is being taken, as the case may be, shall
designate, and after all present have been sworn to secrecy. The transcript
of testimony containing such information shall be segregated and filed in a
sealed envelope, bearing the tide and docket number of the proceeding,
and the notation 'Classified or Confidential Treatment Requested Under
§ 302.39 Testimony Given by (name of witness or deponent).' Within five
(5) days after such testimony is given, the objecting person shall file a
motion, except as hereinafter provided in paragraph (c) of this section,
in accordance with the procedure outlined in paragraph (d) of this section,
to withhold the information from public disclosure. Notwithstanding any
other provision of this section, copies of the segregated portion of the transcript and of the motion need not be served upon any other party unless
so ordered by the Board.
(c) Objection by Government departments or representative thereof. In
the case of objection to the public disclosure of any information filed by
or elicited from any United States Government department, or representative thereof, under paragraph (a) or (b) of this section, the department
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the submissions made by the various executive branch parties in the
reopened portion of the Pacific Islands case were treated on a confidential basis:
Upon representations of the Departments of the Interior, State
and Defense, to the effect that the evidence they wished to present
related to matters of national security which should be withheld
from public disclosure, the examiner conducted the prehearing
conference and all sessions of the supplemental hearing in executive
session pursuant to Rule 39 of the Board's Rules of Practice. The
examiner's supplemental recommended decision was also accorded
confidential treatment. We shall continue to accord confidential
treatment to the record of the prehearing conference held on
August 5, 1970, the hearings held on September 9 and 10, those
portions of the supplemental recommended decision not attached
to this opinion, and other filings. Disclosure of this information
at this time would adversely affect the interests of the United
States and is not required in the interest of the public.9 5
Although such classified matters, to which applicant parties would
not have access, might prove dispositive in exceptional cases, such critical data at least would have been considered by five Board members
of proven judicial integrity, and the decision would have been reached
in a protected judicial atmosphere.
The Board in the PacificIslands case stressed the importance of having
such executive branch submissions at the licensing proceeding:
The participation by Federal agencies in Board cases relevant to
their areas of responsibility is of vital importance to the public
interest.... In many cases (a full) record can only be assured
by the participation of Federal Agencies which have information
and viewpoints not available to or expressed by the private parties
appearing before the Board. Agency participation is also a matter
making such objection shall be exempted from the provisions of paragraphs
(a), (b), and (d) of this section insofar as said paragraphs require the
filing of a written objection to such disclosure. However, any department,
or person representing said department, if it so desires, may file a memorandum setting forth the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that a
public disclosure of the information should not be made. If such a memorandum is submitted, it shall be filed and handled as is provided by this
section in the case of a motion to withhold information from public disclosure.
95. CAB Order 71-7-174, at 4, n.6 (July 27, 1971).
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of fairness to the parties whose economic interests are at stake,
since it would provide the only practical and proper forum for
testing those agency allegations which might be of decisional significance by presentation of further information, opposing views,
and arguments, and by appropriate cross-examination. 6
Subsequently, in the Service to Saipan Case,9 7 Continental Air Lines,
pursuant to the above quoted view of the Board, sought by petition to
designate as parties to the proceeding the Departments of Commerce,
Defense, Interior, Justice, State, and Transportation. The Board thereupon held:
We do not believe as a general proposition that it would be
appropriate for us to compel other Federal agencies to participate
in Board proceedings. Their participation should remain a matter
within their discretion. However, as we stated in the Pacific
Islands case, there are particular reasons why Federal agencies
should exercise their discretion to participate in Board proceedings in which subsequent Presidential action will be required
pursuant to section 801 of the Federal Aviation Act. If such agencies have evidence and views with respect to the issues in such
proceedings, fairness to the parties involved, to the Board, and
to the public at large requires the presentation of that evidence
and those views in the forum provided by the Board, so that they
may be publicly scrutinized. Otherwise, if an agency's involvement in the case is limited to presentation of views to the President only after the Board has submitted its decision to the President, the Board and the parties will have no appropriate occasion
to consider those views, even though they might be critical to the
ultimate disposition of the case. Presentation of an agency's views
to the Board will permit a more-informed decision by the Board,
and hence a better decision for the Presidentes review. We recognize, of course, that in some cases there may be information which
is appropriate for the President alone to hear, but these cases will
be few. 8
It is thus evident that executive branch participation in international
route cases, if desired, should be confined to submission on the record
in the licensing proceedings. Whatever may have been the case in the
96. Id. at 5-6.
97. CAB Order 72-10-81 (October 25, 1972).
98. Id. at 2.
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past, there no longer appears to be any justification for retention by
the President of the powers granted by section 801. Executive branch
interests can be presented fully at the agency licensing stage of the
process, and there is no valid basis on which to assume that the Board
would not accord due weight to the foreign relations and national
security factors presented to it either in open hearing or in executive
session. Moreover, in the post-licensing, implementation phase of the
international air route process, the Board would be subject to the provisions of sections 802 and 1102 of the Act. Finally, any party, including the President either directly or through an executive department,
could obtain judicial review of any Board decision.
Significantly, in the Pacific Islands case, the President requested that
new authority to Okinawa be made temporary for a five year period
because the Reversion Agreement whereby Okinawa is being returned
to Japanese sovereignty specified that after five years landing rights in
Okinawa would become chargeable to the United States in determining
a fair overall schedule balance under the U.S.-Japanese Bilateral Aviation Agreement." The Board promptly adopted this suggestion."0°
There is thus no valid basis to retain in the President power which, as
numerous cases have shown, presents the potential for undercutting the
judicial integrity of the Board's administrative process.
The foregoing proposal would insure the determination of the rights
of all the parties under judicial standards and bring the determination
of international airline route awards into conformity with the traditional notion that it is one of the primary functions of the judiciary to
guarantee that other organs of government act within the bounds of
legal and constitutional requirements. At the same time, the Board
would have before it the most complete possible information upon
which to base its decision, and the President would be afforded the
opportunity to contribute the foreign relations and national security
input which he uniquely is able to provide.

99. Letter from President Nixon to CAB Chairman Browne, July 21, 1971. CAB
Dockets 17353, 16242.
100. CAB Order 71-7-174 (July 27, 1971).

